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THE SELF:
KIERKEGAARD AND BUDDHISM IN DIALOGUE
DAVID WISDO
ABSTRACT: Is it possible for there to be a fruitful dialogue between Søren Kierkegaard
and Buddhists regarding the understanding of the self? In this paper, I explore the
possibilities for such a dialogue by first discussing the rejection of substantialism shared by
Kierkegaard and Buddhists. Next, although many Buddhists accept a reductionist account of
the kind found in the Abhidharma tradition, Madhyamaka thinkers such as Nāgārjuna and
Candrakīrti are well-known for offering an account of the self, based on the notion of
emptiness (śūnyatā), which resembles in some ways the account of the self that is proposed by
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto Death. Third, I discuss
Jonardon Ganeri’s performativist theory of the self and his suggestion that this view,
originally developed by Candrakīrti, informs the view of the self which is developed by
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. I
conclude by exploring how Ganeri’s perfomativist theory of the self can illuminate recent
attempts by both Buddhist and Kierkegaard scholars to articulate their accounts of the self by
an appeal to narrative.
Keywords: Anthony Rudd, Buddhism, Candrakīrti, emptiness, Jonardon Ganeri,
Kierkegaard, Marya Schechtman, Nāgārjuna, narrative, no-self, performativist theory of the
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1. INTRODUCTION
When one examines the basic teachings of Buddhism or the writings of the Danish
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, it becomes clear in both cases that questions about
the nature of the self are of decisive spiritual importance. For Buddhists, on the one
hand, the notion of the self comes under critical scrutiny. Their claim is that the idea
of a permanent, unchanging self is an illusion. Since this illusion is the source of the
craving that underlies the spiritual disease of suffering (duḥkha), the goal is to
overcome this illusion through Buddhist practice. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand,
it is precisely the loss of the self which is the source of the disease characterized by
________________________
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his pseudonym Anti-Climacus as the “sickness unto death.” The cure, says
Kierkegaard, does not involve viewing the self as an illusion to be overcome. Instead,
Kierkegaard recommends the spiritual practice he calls “edification” which aims to
build up (at bygge op) the self. Finally, because Kierkegaard views this spiritual goal
of edification from an explicitly Christian perspective, he does not understand this
practice of “building up” the self as an autonomous activity but rather as a response to
God’s ongoing invitation to realize oneself as a creature dependent upon God.
I would like to argue that despite their differences, Kierkegaard and Buddhists
share some basic assumptions about the self. First, when Buddhists speak of the self
as an illusion or when Kierkegaard says that the self is not simply a “given” but rather
something that must be “built up,” they are rejecting a metaphysical view that regards
the self as a simple, static substance. In the case of Kierkegaard, this might be
understood as a rejection of the kind of substantialism defended by René Descartes;
whereas in the case of Buddhism this can be understood as a rejection of the idea of a
permanent and unchanging self (ātman). More interesting, I shall argue, is that
something similar to the Buddhist notion of emptiness (śūnyatā), articulated and
defended by Mahayana Buddhists such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, informs
Kierkegaard’s understanding of the self as it is presented by his pseudonym AntiClimacus in the The Sickness Unto Death. To develop this idea in more detail, I will
discuss Jonardon Ganeri’s performativist theory of the self as well as his suggestion
that this kind of approach, inspired by Candrakīrti, also informs the account of the
self as it is presented by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus in the
Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
Finally, I will suggest that Ganeri’s
performativist theory, as it pertains to both Buddhist and Kierkegaardian views of the
self, can be further developed in light of recent narrative theories of the self that have
been appropriated by Buddhist and Kierkegaard scholars.
2. AGAINST SUBSTANTIALISM
There is a long-standing tradition among philosophers to think of individuals as either
being or having a self, regarded as a simple unchanging substance that constitutes the
individual’s essential nature. What is it, after all, that allows me to identify myself as
the same individual over time—yesterday, today, and tomorrow? What is it that
explains why I care about my past and my future? Why do I feel moral responsibility
for past misdeeds and resolve to avoid them in the future? Among Western thinkers,
Plato is well-known for defending the idea of a simple, unchanging, and immortal
soul in the Phaedo. A similar view is later affirmed and defended by René Descartes,
whose name now informs how we speak of this substantialist view whenever we
refer, for example, to a “Cartesian ego.” Similarly, before and after the time of the
Buddha, philosophers and religious thinkers in India also developed and affirmed a
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substantialist notion of the self, introduced in the Upaniṣads, which they spoke of as
ātman.1
Although there are many reasons why one might reject such a substantialist view
of the self, for Buddhists the motivation has always been largely soteriological. The
Four Noble Truths begin by identifying our primary existential malady as suffering
(duḥkha): a pervasive disease that arises from desire, aversion and a fundamental
ignorance as to the nature of reality, what Jay Garfield terms a “primal confusion”
(Garfield 2015, 9-11). In addition to a refusal to see that all things are impermanent
and conditioned, we cling to the mistaken idea of an enduring and substantial self. As
it turns out, it is clinging to this mistaken idea of a substantial self which is largely
responsible for suffering. Fortunately, the Third Noble Truth points to a cure: the
cessation of suffering (nirvāṇa). The realization that the substantial self is an illusion
leads to the extinction of the desire and aversion that fuels suffering. Finally, this cure
is found in the Fourth Noble Truth, a path that presents a therapeutic regimen
involving morality, meditation and the cultivation of wisdom.
Of course, if the extinction of suffering requires that we give up the mistaken
substantialist view of the self, the obvious question is: what is the right view? The
standard analysis given in early traditions and later developed with much rigor and
sophistication in the Abhidharma literature involves a reductionist account (Siderits
2007, 32-68). The claim is that the self is a composite of five aggregates (skandhas)
that are impermanent and always changing. In addition to the bodily component,
rūpa, there are four mental components: feeling (vedanā), that is, the sense that a
mental state is pleasant, painful or neutral, perception (saṃjñā), volition (saṃskāra)
and consciousness (vijñāna). What is missing is any reference to a substantial
unchanging self and this, of course, is the point. Without examining the details of the
arguments used to support this reductionist picture (see Siderits 2007, 37-50), the
Buddhist conclusion is clear. There is no basis for the erroneous and unwholesome
view that individuals are substantial selves.
When we turn to Kierkegaard’s writings, especially The Sickness Unto Death
attributed to his pseudonym Anti-Climacus, we find another interesting antisubstantialist view of the self. Once again, the account here does not aim to address
technical metaphysical concerns for their own sake. Like Buddhists, Anti-Climacus’s
discussion of the self is motivated mainly by ethical and soteriological concerns. Here
is the first part of his now classic but perplexing characterization of the self:
The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self?
The self is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to
itself. The self is not the relation but the relation’s relating to itself. A human being is a
synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and
1

The doctrine of ātman which appears in the Upaniṣads not only involves the idea of an unchanging
substantial self but also the idea that this unchanging substantial self is identical to the universal self or
Brahman. For a detailed discussion of ātman and the brahmanical context in which the idea arises see
Williams, Tribe and Wynne (2012, 4-15).
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necessity. In short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two terms. Looked at
in this way a human being is not yet a self.
In a relation between two things the relation is the third term in the form of a negative
unity, and the two relate to the relation, and in the relation to that relation; this is what it
is from the point of view of soul for soul and body to be in relation. If, on the other hand,
the relation relates to itself, then this relation is the positive third, and this is the self
(Kierkegaard 1989, 43).

Despite the voluminous commentary generated by this passage,2 it is worth reminding
ourselves of its obvious features. First, although the two initial claims—that “the
human being is spirit” and “spirit is the self” (Kierkegaard 1989, 43)—might suggest
that Anti-Climacus intends to develop a traditional substantialist account of the self,
the remainder of the passage leaves no doubt that this is precisely the view he aims to
reject. 3 The self is neither a substance nor an object of any kind. Instead, AntiClimacus provides the surprisingly original characterization of the self as an ongoing
and dynamic synthesis involving three “existential” dimensions, each of which
involves contrasting opposites: the infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal,
and freedom and necessity. Some commentators4 interpret these contrasting opposites
in such a way as to express the relation between the body and the soul mentioned by
Anti-Climacus—the body, involving finitude, temporality, and necessity; and soul,
involving the infinite, the eternal and freedom. Again, although such an analysis
might suggest a kind of substance dualism, neither the body nor the soul should be
understood as a static Cartesian substances. Rather the point is to suggest that the self
emerges from the dynamic tension between these opposing poles. Not only is the self,
as necessity, a limited, temporal being; the self, as freedom, possesses an eternal
dimension which is its possibility for realizing itself. Moreover, Anti-Climacus refers
to these poles as involving a relation; “a relation which relates to itself, or that in the
relation which is its relating to itself” (Kierkegaard 1989, 43). And just in case we
might be tempted to construe this relation as static, Anti-Climacus quickly reminds us
that the self is “the relation’s relating to itself” (Kierkegaard 1989, 43); that is, the
self is an activity that constitutes itself in this relation. In short, the self just is the
activity of becoming a self.
Like the Buddhist then Anti-Climacus presents an analysis which does away with
the metaphysical notion of a static substantial self. Although the specifics of the
2

The dense and enigmatic nature of the passage has led one Kierkegaard scholar to comment that “this
is not the gobbledygook it seems to be, though there is good reason why it must seem so” (Mackey
1971, 135). Other interpretations of this difficult text include Dunning (1985, 215-17), Elrod (1975,
29-32), Hannay (1982, 190-94), Malantschuk (1971, 343-47), and Taylor (1980, 166-72). For more
recent scholarship focusing on this passage see Davenport (2013, 233-38), Dreyfus (2008, 12-23),
Mooney (1996, 89-93), Rudd (2012, 40-43), and Stokes (2010, 61-69) and (2015, 143-47).
3
With some exceptions, e.g. Jamie Turnbull (2011), most contemporary Kierkegaard scholars interpret
Kierkegaard as rejecting the idea that the self is a substance. See e.g. Davenport (2013, 234), Grøn
(2004, 131), Rudd (2012, 41), and Stokes (2010, 66) and (2015, 144).
4
See, e.g. Dreyfus (2008, 13) and Davenport (2013, 235).
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analysis differ, both Anti-Climacus and the Buddhist agree that the self must be
understood primarily in terms of change. Anti-Climacus adds to his account a multidimensional analysis of the self that characterizes this change as activity, whose goal
is the constitution of the self. In short, for Anti-Climacus there is no self apart from its
own ongoing and dynamic activity of synthesis which Patrick Stokes nicely sums up
as a task:
Anti-Climacus holds that selfhood is not a stable ‘given,’ such that membership in the
human race automatically confers that status of selfhood… the self is fundamentally a
task, something we are supposed to become, not something we find ourselves as being,
and something we can easily cease to be (Stokes 2010, 63).

One might object to this kind of account for the simple reason that the selfconstitutive activity described by Anti-Climacus would seem to presuppose a
substantial self. After all, the objection might go, how can there be such activity
unless there is a substantial self to perform it? As a first response to this objection, it
is important to keep in mind that Anti-Climacus is not denying that there is a self.
What he is denying is that the self is to be understood in a certain way; namely as a
simple static substance. The view he is affirming is that the self just is the activity of
constituting itself as the ongoing synthesis of the finite and infinite, the temporal and
eternal, and freedom and necessity.
Unfortunately, this response to the first objection gives rise to a second. For even
if the Kierkegaardian self is not a substance in the Cartesian sense, there does seem to
be something strange about saying that the self is an activity whereby it creates itself.
The claim that the self makes itself through its own activity does not seem to make
sense. How can the self be both the source and product of its activity? Interestingly,
Kierkegaard himself is aware of the paradox. In an earlier upbuilding discourse,
originally published in 1843, entitled To Gain One’s Soul in Patience he makes the
following observation:
But if a person possesses his soul, he certainly does not need to gain it, and if he does not
possess it, how can he gain it since the soul itself is the ultimate condition that is
presupposed in every acquiring, consequently also in gaining the soul. Could there be a
possession of that sort, which signifies precisely the condition of being able to gain the
same possession (Kierkegaard 1990, 163-64)?

Moreover, in his attempt to solve the paradox, he includes a description of the soul
that anticipates the description of the self in The Sickness Unto Death:
The soul is the contradiction of the temporal and the eternal, and here, therefore, the same
thing can be can possessed and the same thing gained at the same time. Indeed, what is
more, if the soul is this contradiction, it can only be possessed in such a way that it is
gained and gained in such a way that it is possessed (Kierkegaard 1990, 164).
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Is it possible to say anything more in attempting to resolve this paradox? What does it
mean to say of the soul or of the self that “it can only be possessed in such a way that
it is gained and gained in such a way that it is possessed” (Kierkegaard, 1990, 164)?
Fortunately, this question has been examined in detail by the contemporary
philosopher Christine Korsgaard who has identified this worry as the “paradox of
self-constitution.” She expresses the paradox as follows:
It is as a possessor of personal or practical identity that you are the author of your actions,
and responsible for them. And yet at the same time it is in choosing your actions that you
create your identity. What this means is that you constitute yourself as the author of your
actions in the very act of choosing them. I am fully aware that this sounds paradoxical.
How can you constitute yourself, create yourself, unless you are already there? Call this
the paradox of self-constitution (Korsgaard 2009, 20).

How does Korsgaard propose to resolve this paradox? According to Korsgaard,
the paradox disappears once we realize that the process of self-constitution is
analogous to the process of living. Appealing to Aristotle, Korsgaard first observes
that the process of living is best understood as the organism’s activity of making itself
into itself. Next, she observes that the form of life distinctive of human beings
involves rational activity. Finally, if this rational activity is the self-conscious activity
involved in the construction of personal identity, then “being a person, like being a
living thing, is being engaged in the activity of self-constitution” (Korsgaard 2009,
42). I would add, moreover, that just as we do not need to appeal to some mysterious
substance—a Bergsonian élan vital—to explain life, in the same way we do not need
some mysterious Cartesian substance to explain the self as a self-constitutive activity.
At this point we are in a better position to identify places of agreement and
disagreement between Kierkegaard and Buddhists. First, although Kierkegaard agrees
with Buddhists in rejecting a substantialist account of the self, he would likely not
accept as an alternative their reductionist theory, nor would he accept versions more
familiar to western thinkers, such as David Hume’s “bundle theory.” This is because
he insists that the cultivation of a self, what he calls edification or “building up”
(opbyggelse) is the aim of spiritual practice. In fact, contrary to the Buddhist who
says that the only way to overcome suffering is to reject the self as an illusion, AntiClimacus affirms it. So here we do have a real conflict between Buddhist and
Kierkegaardian views of the self, at least on the question of whether it’s good to
cultivate one. The Buddhist insists that because belief in the self is an unwholesome
illusion that leads to suffering, it must be subjected to a reductionist analysis.
Kierkegaard’s Anti-Climacus, however, would reject any kind of reductionist analysis
insofar as it undermines his primary aim of affirming the edification of the self.
There is one more crucial point made by Anti-Climacus in the opening sections of
The Sickness Unto Death which is bound to complicate matters. Given his explicitly
Christian perspective, we should not be surprised to discover that in addition to
affirming the self as a task to be achieved, Anti-Climacus insists this activity is not
autonomous. As he puts it, because the self is a derived relation constituted by God, it
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can despair in two ways: either by wanting to get rid of itself or by wanting in defiant
despair to be itself. Throughout the remainder of The Sickness Unto Death then AntiClimacus provides detailed diagnoses of these two pathological conditions. In the
first case, an individual can despair either by forgetting that it is a self or by trying to
lose itself in a wide variety of ways. In the second case, since the individual is a
creature dependent upon God, one also suffers from despair to the extent that one
aims to become a self in an independent and autonomous fashion, which AntiClimacus characterizes as defiance. In more theological language then the task of
becoming a self involves an ongoing response to God’s grace. Ultimately, says AntiClimacus, the only cure for despair is when “in relating to itself and in wanting to be
itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power that constituted it” (Kierkegaard
1989, 44).
3. FROM REDUCTIONISM TO THE MIDDLE WAY
Up until this point our comparison of Kierkegaard and Buddhism has been based on
the kinds of reductionist accounts of the self that are found in the early Buddhist
tradition. Unfortunately, if we were forced to limit our discussion of Kierkegaard and
Buddhism to these early reductive analyses, we might have to admit that we have
reached a dead end. It turns out, however, that there is another path open for
exploration. Over time a new idea appeared in the scriptural tradition of Mahayana
Buddhism known as the Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) literature.5 This is
the idea of śūnyata or emptiness. As we shall see, this new idea provides Mahayana
Buddhist philosophers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti with a framework for
criticizing earlier reductionist accounts of the self and for developing a new
philosophical approach that extends the idea of no-self in a radical way to everything
that exists. More importantly, for our purposes it also opens new possibilities for
comparing Kierkegaardian and Buddhist views of the self.
Before turning to these issues, however, it is important to mention that the
reductionist approach to the self that is characteristic of early Buddhism culminated in
the Abhidharmikas which radicalized this way of thinking by extending the reductive
analysis to all phenomena, not just selves. According to this more radical
reductionism, everything can be analyzed by breaking phenomena down into
dharmas, which several philosophers have characterized as tropes, i.e. property
particulars (Siderits 2007, 115; Garfield 2015, 45). According to one school, although
what we experience as tables and chairs appear to be relatively stable and permanent,
close analysis reveals that they can be reduced to more fundamental phenomena
which, though momentary, are said to possess their own intrinsic nature (svabhāva).
Thus, the Abhidharma approach can be viewed as bringing the reductionist project to
5

For historical details on the emergence of Mahayana thought and the concept of emptiness (śūnyata)
in the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) Sūtras see Williams (2009, 45-62) and Williams, Tribe
and Wynne (2012, 98-104). The short and well-known Heart Sūtra (Hṛdayam Sūtra) in Conze (1973,
140-41) provides a concise presentation of the teaching.
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its logical conclusion. In the final analysis, according to the Abhidharmikas, we need
to distinguish the ultimate truth about things, revealed by a thoroughgoing reduction
of everything into dharmas, from the conventional truth of ordinary everyday
experience. In short, we must to ready to acknowledge that only dharmas are
ultimately real and that everything else, including selves, are at best useful fictions.
Given this radical kind of reductionism, it should come as no surprise that both
Buddhists and outside critics expressed concern over its troubling implications.
Among Buddhists, the most thoroughgoing critique can be found in the Madhyamaka
or Middle Way developed and defended by Nāgārjuna and his commentators, most
notably Candrakīrti. According to the Madhyamka, the reductionist project of the
Adhidharma, far from vindicating the central teaching of dependent origination
(pratītya-samutpāda) undermines it by positing an unacceptable ontological dualism
between composites that are subject to dependent origination, and dharmas which,
possessing intrinsic nature, are said to be independent. Given this ontological
dualism, the reductionist is forced to accept a troubling conclusion about conventional
existence. The problem, the Mādhyamikas argue, is that by reducing conventional
existence to a mere fiction, the Adhidharma approach slides into nihilism.
What then is the solution? To vindicate conventional existence, the Mādhyamikas
insist that all phenomena are empty (śūnyatā) of inherent existence. But what does
this mean? First, we need to guard against the mistaken conclusion that this is just
another, even more radical form of nihilism. To say everything is empty of inherent
existence is not to make the nihilistic claim that nothing exists. The aim rather is to
explain how things exist. In saying that everything is empty of inherent existence,
Mādhyamikas are saying that the only way anything can exist at all is
interdependently with all things. As Jay Garfield sums it up with reference to
Nāgārjuna’s analysis of emptiness: “the only reality anything can have is
conventional reality. To be real on this understanding is hence not to possess, but to
lack, ultimate reality” (Garfield 2015, 65).
4. A PERFORMATIVIST THEORY OF THE SELF?
The question now is this: What implications might the Madhyamaka view of
emptiness have for our understanding of selves; and how might this account advance
the dialogue between Kierkegaard and Buddhism on the self? Can the Madhyamaka
view of emptiness provide a framework for developing and defending an alternative
account of the self? One interesting approach in this regard has been suggested by
Jonardon Ganeri who, inspired by Nāgārjuna’s commentator Candrakīrti, proposes
what he calls a performativist theory of the self (Ganeri 2012, 183-213). To motivate
the theory, Ganeri considers the challenge expressed by Nāgārjuna in chapter 18 of
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) regarding
how to understand the relation between the self and the skandhas or aggregates. In
this very condensed argument, Nāgārjuna rejects two possibilities:
If the self were the aggregates,
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It would have arising and ceasing (as properties).
If it were different from the aggregates,
It would not have the characteristics of the aggregates (Garfield 1995, 245).

How, according to Ganeri, does Candrakīrti understand this dilemma? On the one
hand, if the self consists in the aggregates, it would constantly be arising and ceasing.
The unacceptable result would be a proliferation of selves coming in and out of
existence (Ganeri 2012, 197). If, on the other hand, the self was something
completely different from the aggregates, this could not explain our sense of owning
our experiences and would be, in Ganeri’s words, “an idle wheel” (Ganeri 2012, 19596). But if the self is neither reducible to the aggregates, nor separate and distinct
from them, how exactly should we understand the dependence relation? Ganeri
argues that Candrakīrti provides the key by suggesting that this relation is one of
“appropriating” (upādāna). Instead of mistakenly thinking of the self as an object or
of the word “self” as a referring term, Ganeri suggests that we follow Candrakīrti for
whom the self is better understood as a performative process. Ganeri highlights this
point by citing chapter 6 verses 162-3 of Candrakīrti’s Introduction to the Middle
Way (Madhyamakāvatāra):
And thus the self—dependent on the aggregates, the elements, and the senses as they are
in daily life—is thought of as the appropriator of the same; these are the objects
appropriated, the self their appropriator. The self is not a real, existent thing, and thus it is
not constant, for it has no birth or ending. Attributes like permanence do not apply to it,
and it is not, nor is it other than, the aggregates (Candrakīrti 2002, 6.162-3; cited by
Ganeri, 2012, 199).

One might still conceivably object to this account insofar as it appears to reintroduce
surreptitiously the very thing it seeks to deny; namely, the idea of a substantial self.
After all, if one wants to say that the self just is a process of appropriation, doesn’t
this mean that the appropriator doing the appropriating must be a substance? Notice
that this worry resembles the one raised earlier in our discussion of Anti-Climacus,
where the issue was whether there can be self-synthesizing activity—involving the
infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal, and freedom and necessity—
without a substantial self. Ganeri’s own solution, as mentioned above, appeals
explicitly to a claim about the semantics of the word “I” and his insistence that the
word should not be understood as a referring term. However, another possible
solution to this “paradox of self-appropriation” is to appeal once again to Christine
Korsgaard’s solution to the paradox of self-constitution (Korsgaard 2009, 42). As we
have seen in our earlier discussion, just as we do not need a permanent independent
substance to explain the process by which living things make themselves, so too there
is no need for a permanent independent substance to explain how the self can create
itself through the process of self-appropriation.
Given Ganeri’s claim that Candrakīrti is offering a performativist theory of the
self, the next question is whether this suggestion could possibly be brought into
constructive dialogue with Kierkegaard’s understanding of the self. Interestingly, in
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his attempt to muster independent support for this performativist account, Ganeri
enlists several western thinkers whom he sees as supporting this view, ranging from
John Locke and William James to Elizabeth Anscombe and Simon Blackburn (Ganeri
2012, 200-1). For our purpose, what is most striking is a footnote in which Ganeri
explicitly makes the connection with Kierkegaard by suggesting that the
performativist theory of the self seems to be affirmed by his pseudonym Johannes
Climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The passages he cites are
specifically those in which Johannes Climacus discusses truth and refers to truth
understood subjectively first as “an objective uncertainty, held fast through
appropriation with the most passionate inwardness” (Hong 1992, 202; cited by Ganeri
2012, 201) and later as a truth that is “the self-activity of appropriation” (Hong 1992,
202; cited by Ganeri 2012, 201). Ganeri himself does not develop his intriguing idea
in further detail, so it might be worth our while to see where his suggestion might
lead.
First, we need to examine in a bit more detail what Ganeri means by a
performativist theory of the self. In developing this theory, inspired by Candrakīrti’s
commentary, Ganeri is particularly interested in how we use words such as “I” and
“mine.” After noting that such words are not to be understood as referring to an object
or a thing, Ganeri argues that Candrakīrti is offering a “use-explanatory account” of
the word, which he characterizes as follows:
The utterance of ‘I’ serves an appropriative function, to claim possession of, to take
something as one’s own. The appropriation in question is to be thought of as an activity
of laying claim to, not the making of an assertion of ownership. Grammatical form
notwithstanding, the avowal or self-ascription of a mental state, ‘I have a pain’, is not a
two-place relation between me and my pain; nor is it like a club’s having members, or a
tree’s having roots…When I say ‘I am in pain,’ I do not assert ownership of a particular
kind of painful experience; rather I lay claim to the experience within a stream. This is a
performativist account of the language of the self, in which ‘I’ statements are
performative utterances, and not assertions… (Ganeri 2012, 200).

Ganeri himself chooses to make the connection with Kierkegaard by citing Johannes
Climacus’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript; but I would like to suggest that his
performativist theory of the self can also help shed light on Anti-Climacus’s famously
obscure and enigmatic account of the self which we discussed earlier. When, for
example, Anti-Climacus speaks of the self in The Sickness Unto Death, we have seen
that he wishes to understand the self not as a substance, but rather as a synthesizing
activity. Appealing now to Ganeri’s performativist theory, not only can we speak of
the self’s activity as “the relation’s relating to itself” (Kierkegaard 1989, 43), we can
also speak of it as a performative activity wherein I lay claim—to use Ganeri’s
specific phrase—to the continuing synthesis of the infinite and the finite, the temporal
and the eternal, and freedom and necessity.
Of course, when making these connections we need to take care. Although Ganari
uses the word “appropriation” to describe both Candrakīrti’s understanding of
“selfing” and Johannes Climacus’s view of the self-constitution in the Postscript, the
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different contexts are sure to complicate matters. So when he discusses
“appropriating” (upādāna) as Candrakīrti understands it, Ganeri emphasizes that the
classic Buddhist context for the word upādāna and its cognates makes reference to
fuel, as in fuel for a fire. Referring to another passage from Candrakīrti, for example,
Ganeri reminds us that the fuel is what is appropriated—namely the five aggregates—
and the self is the constructive activity of appropriation (Ganeri 2012, 199).
Moreover, as Ganeri also points out, the Buddhist understands the word as carrying
the negative connotations of “grasping, clinging, addiction” (Edgerton 1953; cited by
Ganeri 2012, 198). Finally, and most importantly, when we remember that the goal of
the path is nirvana—to put out the fire—we will appreciate the urgency of
undertaking the appropriate spiritual practices to stop feeding it. In other words, if
appropriation or “laying claim” to the stream is what fuels the fire of samsara, then
we need to embark upon the Buddhist path and stop feeding it to put out the activity
of self-appropriation (Ganeri 2012, 202-3).
In the world according to Kierkegaard, of course, things are very different. First,
if we follow Ganeri’s suggestion that Kierkegaard, like Candrakīrti, sees “selfing” as
an activity of appropriation, we must first remember that the Danish word tilegnelse
translated by both the Hongs and Alasdair Hannay as “appropriation” is quite
straightforward. The word does not have special associations as upādāna does; nor
are there the negative connotations of “grasping, clinging and addiction.” In addition,
for Kierkegaard this activity of appropriation, so far from being the source of spiritual
illness, holds instead the promise of spiritual recovery. For when we ask what is being
appropriated for Kierkegaard in this activity of “selfing” we discover not five
aggregates but rather the continuing activity of synthesizing the infinite and the finite,
the temporal and the eternal, and freedom and necessity. Finally, as already
mentioned, this task of appropriation is not autonomous. Throughout The Sickness
unto Death Anti-Climacus reminds us that a self that defiantly asserts itself as an
independent being is a self in despair. For this reason, Anti-Climacus emphasizes the
Christian idea that the appropriation process involved in becoming a self is always
dependent on God.
5. APPROPRIATION, PERFORMANCE AND NARRATIVE
When we ask what might be the best way to articulate and develop this kind of
performativist theory of the self, whether along Buddhist or Kierkegaardian lines, we
will discover resources already available in the growing literature focusing on self
and narrative. For several decades, ever since the publication of works such as
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, Charles Taylor’s Sources of Self and Paul
Ricoeur’s three volume Time and Narrative, there has been a growing interest among
philosophers asking how narrative can provide a framework for addressing a host of
issues, ranging from traditional metaphysical questions concerning personal identity
to normative questions concerning ethics and selfhood. Interestingly, a growing
number of Kierkegaard scholars such as John Davenport and Anthony Rudd have
answered MacIntytre’s infamous critique of Kierkegaard in After Virtue with the
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claim that Kierkegaard himself can best be understood as a narrativist (Davenport and
Rudd 2002). At the same time, the appeal to narrative has not been limited to
Kierkegaard scholars. Thinkers focusing on Buddhist philosophy such as Jay Garfield
have also discussed the extent to which narrative might be helpful in elucidating
Buddhist views on issues such as selfhood and ethics. Although it is impossible to do
justice to this rich area of reflection in this short essay, a brief overview of the basic
ideas will show how an appeal to narrative might provide a helpful way to develop
Ganeri’s performativist theory of the self.
One very influential narrative theory of the self which appears to have much in
common with Ganeri’s performativist account has been developed by Marya
Schechtman who defends what she calls the Narrative Self-Constitution View
(Schechtman 1996, 93-135). Much like Ganeri’s performativist theory which
identifies the self as the activity of appropriation, Schechtman stresses the equally
strong claim that selves are constituted by their narratives. The basic claim of
Schechtman’s Narrative Self-Constitution View is that “we constitute ourselves as
selves by understanding our lives in narrative form and living accordingly”
(Schechtman 2011, 398). Despite the strong main thesis that the self is constituted by
narrative, the specific claims she makes in articulating and defending the main thesis
turn out to be rather modest. For example, she is quick to point out that her view does
not require each individual to self-consciously and explicitly tell a story of their life.
Instead, the narratives are, as she says, “largely implicit and automatic” (Schechtman
2007, 162). Also, despite the strong thesis that selves are constituted by their
narratives, it is not the case that anything goes. Schechtman insists that there are
constraints on self-constitution: first, an articulation constraint which is the modest
requirement that one be able to “articulate one’s narrative locally where appropriate”
(Schechtman 2011, 405) and second, a reality constraint, which means that one’s
narrative should conform to society’s general conception of reality (Schechtman
2011, 405). Finally, it is also important to stress that unlike some narrative theorists
such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor whose interest in defending a robust
ethical conception of the self leads them to require a thick conception of the good,
Schechtman grants that her account is not strongly evaluative nor is its focus the
ethical orientation of the self.
When we compare Schechtman’s Narrative Self-Constitution View with accounts
of narrative developed by Kierkegaardians such as John Davenport and Anthony
Rudd we should not be surprised by some radical differences. Anthony Rudd, for
example, sums up his Kierekgaardian approach to the question of narrative and
selfhood with the acronym NEST which stands for Narrative, Evaluative, SelfConstitution and Teleology (Rudd 2012, 2). As the four key features of his thesis
indicate, he shares with Schechtman the basic claim that selves are constituted by
their narratives but adds that this requires that one balance the demands of selfacceptance with the demands of self-shaping. What distinguishes Rudd’s
Kierekegaardian account from Schechtman’s view is his insistence that a coherent
narrative requires a robust ethical orientation based on a teleological conception of
the self. In this respect, his self-constitution account of narrative bears a stronger
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resemblance to the account developed by MacInytre in After Virtue than to
Schechtman’s view. Unlike MacIntyre, however—known for famously taking
Aristotle as his point of departure—Rudd takes his inspiration from Kierkegaard
whose theory of selfhood, he argues, is based on a Platonic teleology. So although
Rudd accepts the self-constitution view, as a Kierkegaardian he wishes to accentuate
Anti-Climacus’s claim that the activity of narrative appropriation whereby one
becomes a self is not autonomous, nor is the self’s goal a natural one. According to
Rudd, it is the quest for the Good, understood in Platonic terms, that underlies AntiClimacus’s insistence upon a Christian framework for self-making.
What role might narrative play in attempts to spell out the implications of
Ganeri’s performativist theory from a Buddhist perspective? As it turns out, several
recent thinkers have discovered that narrative provides perhaps the best and most
natural way to articulate the Buddhist insight that the self is a conventional
construction that arises simply insofar as it just is the ongoing activity of
appropriation. In a recent book Engaging Buddhism, for example, Jay Garfield
suggests that this ongoing activity of appropriation unfolds in the process of selfshaping narratives that give rise to our being as ethical agents:
This is because from any Buddhist perspective…persons are constructed. They are
constructed through the appropriation of aggregates, through recognizing a body as mine,
thought as mine, values, dispositions, and intentions as mine. In turn, those physical and
cognitive processes are also constructed in relation to that person, and the person is
appropriated by them as a locus. That appropriation and construction is itself
accomplished through the narration of a life in which a person emerges as a character
(Garfield 2015, 293).

Garfield goes on to note several points with which Kierkegaardians would likely
agree. First, he stresses that the activity of appropriation that unfolds in our narratives
always takes place in a social context in our relations with others. We do not spin our
narratives in isolation. Given our ongoing dependence on others, our narratives
unfold in our ongoing responses to the events and people around us. In addition,
Garfield emphasizes a central point made by most Kierkegaardian defenders of
narrative theory; namely, that narrative is a crucial dimension of ethics insofar as it is
narrative that provides the basic framework for understanding and evaluating actions.
Garfield stresses, however, that we must guard against reducing Buddhist ethics to
those moral theories and categories familiar to us from the western tradition. Instead,
we should view the narratives that frame our moral decisions as providing ways to
“help us to better see how we could participate in further narratives in which we
would like to figure, narratives of greater happiness, of less suffering, of more human
flourishing” (Garfield 2015, 294).
6. CONCLUSION
One might be tempted to conclude here with a simple either/or. Of course, such an
ultimatum might make sense if our aim were simply to articulate a choice between
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nirvana and Kierkegaard’s paradoxical Christianity. With all due respect to Judge
William, however, even though the imperative to “choose oneself” might have its
proper place in the appropriate existential situation, when it comes analyzing the self,
the options are not so clear. As we have seen, debates about the self among Buddhists
and Kierkegaardians reveal that it is a contested notion. And although both Buddhists
and Kierkegaardians might find common ground in Ganeri’s performativist theory of
the self, questions remain about the role of narrative in the activity of selfappropriation. So even if we have not settled the question of whether we should
follow Kierkegaard and regard the self as a task, perhaps we can at least agree that
understanding the self remains a task for us.
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